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ABSTRACT 
 
In this article, we test the relationship between college attendance and earnings for Major League 
Baseball players. Using a cross-section of non-pitchers from the 2005 season, we find that 
schooling does not influence earnings. These results seemingly contradict the schooling-earnings 
theory and suggest that the market for baseball players may be purely talent-driven. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
uman capital theory postulates that individuals attend school and on-the-job training programs to 
gain skills and knowledge that are valuable in the working world in order to increase one’s earning 
power in the labor market (see Polachek and Seibert, 1993). Choosing how much of an investment 
to make in human capital accumulation is a net present value decision, where an economic agent weighs the 
additional income stream anticipated to be generated by attending school or training against the costs of obtaining it. 
For most people, this type of investment activity isn’t free because participants may have to forgo earnings from a 
job, pay tuition, or otherwise give up some other economic opportunity to accumulate human capital. Overall, 
economic agents are expected to make decisions which will maximize their lifetime earnings.  
 
 One such human capital investment decision is whether or not to attend college. For most students, the 
empirical evidence overwhelmingly suggests that regardless of career, the discounted additional income stream 
generated by such a degree is greater than the costs of acquiring that degree. However, there exists a select group of 
individuals who need to decide between going to college to play baseball or entering the minor leagues. For 
individuals drafted in the first few rounds of the amateur draft, the signing bonus and wage offered by Major League 
Baseball teams makes the decision to play minor league baseball sufficiently obvious. For other drafted players who 
do not have the academic requirements to enter college, the decision to play minor league baseball is also clear. But 
there is a group of individuals who are drafted and face the prospect of a relatively low paying minor league contract 
or can choose to forgo those earnings for an athletic scholarship to attend college. For example, in the 2005 draft, 
561 of the 1,501 players drafted were from high schools. Of those 561 players, almost half were drafted in rounds 34 
to 50 (see Czerwinski 2005). Conventional wisdom suggests that professional sports are purely talent driven labor 
markets, but very little research exists which explores a statistical link between education and earnings in 
professional sports leagues.  
 
Barros (2001) found that Portugeuese soccer players have no returns to schooling, but it is not clear how 
applicable his results are overall since his data used amateurs, semi-professional, and professional players from four 
different soccer divisions located near Lisbon. Olbrecht (2007) examined the schooling effects for baseball players. 
He found that free agents, a sub-group of all Major League players, who attended college earned higher valued 
contracts, all else constant. However, it is not clear how applicable his results are, in general.  
 
H 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – May, 2009 Volume 7, Number 5 
64 
The main contribution of this paper is that we test the statistical correlation between schooling and wages 
for all non-pitching Major League Baseball players for the 2005 season. We improve upon previous research by 
investigating the effects of two types of schooling (4-year colleges versus community colleges) and focus our 
attention on players operating under the constraints of the reserve system in addition to those players who are free-
agent eligible.  
 
Our results suggest that additional schooling after high school is not associated with higher earnings in 
professional baseball, suggesting that annual wages are determined by talent. However, it may still be worthwhile to 
attend college if an individual plans to pursue a career after their playing days. The paper is organized as follows: In 
section II, we discuss the data; in section III, we discuss the econometric results; and we conclude the paper in the 
last section.  
 
II.  DATA 
 
One of the advantages to using sports data is that compensation, and more importantly, performance 
(measures of output) data is both readily available and reliable because statistics are uniformly collected and 
calculated, leaving little subjective interpretation (see Kahn, 2000). This characteristic of the data is particularly 
useful because it allows for a direct comparison of observations, which helps minimize the potential for the 
schooling estimate to be biased when estimating an earnings function.  
 
 In addition to the motivation for this study, which is mentioned in the introduction, baseball data is used 
because this league does not have salary caps which could influence a player’s wage. Furthermore, the existence of a 
monopsony work environment (known as baseball’s reserve clause system), an arbitration system, and free agency 
(where player movement between teams is not restricted once a player reaches six years of service), makes the 
investigation into schooling effects more interesting. The inclusion of non-pitchers only in the data is due to the 
plethora and agreement of wage function specifications made available by previous authors such as Scully (1974), 
Kahn (1993), and Krautmann (1999). However, these authors did not include a schooling variable in their earnings 
functions.  
 
 The question then becomes how to measure schooling if information as to how many years a student-
athlete attended college (or whether they earned a degree) is unavailable (Mincer (1974) and others suggest that 
schooling should be measured in years). Fortunately public information is available as to which school, if any, all 
Major League Baseball players attended. Overall, schools attended by players fall into two categories: four-year 
degree granting institutions and junior colleges. Given this information, we created two binary variables to measure 
schooling. The first variable, COLLEGE, takes a one value if an individual attended at least one year of any type of 
college, and zero otherwise. The second variable, FOUR YEAR, takes a one value if a player attended a four year 
collegiate institution, and zero otherwise. 
 
The provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between Major League Baseball and the Player’s 
Association are important when understanding the nuances of the differences between the two schooling variables. 
In the case of players who chose to attend junior college, the agreement specifies that those players can re-enter the 
draft at the end of their freshman seasons. However, players who go on to four-year schools must complete at least 
three seasons before re-entering the draft. Essentially, the variable, FOUR YEAR, measures a more intense 
schooling experience than the COLLEGE variable. However, we will focus our discussion on the more general 
schooling variable, COLLEGE, since the results for both schooling variables are similar.  
 
 In this sample, 227 of the 419 players (approximately 55 percent) attended at least one year of college. 
Tables IA and IB show the variable means and standard deviations for the sample. Additionally we further compare 
the cohorts who went to college and those who did not in Table IA. We do the same for the four year college 
attendees in Table IB.  
 
On average, the hitters in this sample earned $2,999,340 per season. While this number is slightly higher 
than the $2,476,414 average salary for all pitchers and hitters reported by Major League Baseball’s Players 
Association, it is intuitive because hitters generally are paid better than pitchers. The income information in this data 
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is the player’s annual wage, not including performance incentives reached or whether they received a signing bonus. 
Information was collected from various publicly available sources (such as USA Today, Espn.com, etc.) and as much 
as possible figures were verified for accuracy among different sources.  
 
In this sample, players who attended at least one year of college earned annual salaries on average 
$1,092,016 lower than players who did not attend at least one year of college. Upon first glance, it might seem that 
attending college is associated with lower annual earnings, however one must control for performance on the field 
before making any such claims. In this paper, we use career numbers for homeruns, stolen bases and the popular 
variable of career slugging average added to the career on-base-percentage, which Lewis (2003) argued is a better 
measure of a player’s performance on the field.  
 
To control for demographic differences among the players, we use a player’s age at the start of the 2005 
season, how many years of experience they have in the major leagues, and their primary position of play (coded as 
the traditional positions one through nine). 
 
On average, the cohort which went to college has lower career homeruns and stolen bases, fewer years of 
major league experience, and is slightly older. Further, Table IB tells a similar story in that individuals who attended 
four year institutions earn less, but also have lower career numbers. Overall, it seems that there are differences in 
wages between those who attended institutions of higher learning and those who did not. The question is how much 
of those differences can be attributed to performance on the field, and whether education has any role in explaining 
the variation among player wages.  
 
III.  REGRESSION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Generally, economists estimate a version of Mincer’s (1974) log-linear earnings function using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) to establish the statistical correlation between schooling and earnings. The percentage change 
interpretation of the coefficient for schooling is rather straightforward but there exists one important consideration. 
For the coefficient to be unbiased, schooling must be truly exogenous, or otherwise randomly assigned. However, it 
is possible that individuals with greater academic abilities are more likely to attend college, and since these factors 
are usually unobservable, estimating the regression by OLS often means that explanatory variables or the schooling 
measure is correlated with the unobserved disturbances in the equation.  
 
 There exist several innovative methodologies to deal with this issue. First, one can ignore the effects of 
motivation and unobserved abilities when estimating the earnings function (see Long, 1995). Second, one could 
follow the approach of Ashenfelter, Harmon, and Oosterbeeck (1995) and estimate the regression using data which 
compares twins or siblings. However, given that few twins or family members ever play professional sports, this 
approach is not feasible. Another alternative, proposed by Long (1995), is to include measures which control for 
motivation and academic abilities, but this also is not a feasible approach given the limitations of this data.  
 
The final approach, which we use, is to employ an instrumental variables (IV) technique by choosing 
instruments which are sufficiently correlated with schooling but uncorrelated with earnings (for a discussion of this 
approach, see Card, 1995). The instrument used depends upon the data available. In this paper, we use the player’s 
country of birth. Intuitively, players born in the United States have a predisposition to go to college, but it seems 
unlikely for baseball teams to engage in wage based discrimination against foreign born players.
1
   
 
Having discussed the empirical strategies, it is now appropriate to discuss our results. We present the 
estimates for our models in Table II. In model 1, which is estimated by OLS, we find that the coefficient for 
COLLGE is negative but insignificant, meaning that attending college is not associated with higher or lower wages. 
While Barros (2001) used significantly different data than we do, he also found a negative but insignificant 
coefficient when estimating this type of mincerian model.   
 
                                                 
1 We found no statistical correlation between a player’s birth country and wages in this data.  
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However, given our concern that the estimates for this variable may be inconsistent, we report the results 
for the IV approach in column 3. Once again, we find that college attendance seemingly has no effect on the annual 
wages of baseball players. Further, if we examine those individuals who attended a four-year college, we still find 
similar results. In model 2 (estimated by OLS) and model 4 (IV), the estimate on the four year degree schooling 
variable is insignificant.  
 
The estimates for the other variables are as expected. As a player gets older, his earnings are lower. Like 
Mincer (1974), we find that earnings increase with experience, but decrease with the square of experience. Further, 
we find that players who are arbitration eligible earn higher wages than those players under the reserve system and 
those free agent eligible players earn more also. The estimates for career performance are also intuitive. Players with 
more stolen bases, more homeruns and better offensive statistics earn higher wages, all else constant. 
 
Finally, our models do not control for a player’s race because previous research suggests that a player’s 
racial characteristics are not significant determinants of earnings.
2
 For example, Cymrot (1985) argued that the 
competition to win is a strong deterrent against discrimination, and furthermore, Kahn (200)) argued it would be 
counterintuitive to assume that the first professional sports league to become racially diverse would be 
discriminatory in its compensation to its players (see also Jibou, 1988).  
 
Overall, the high R-square values in all four regressions using this type of cross-section data suggest that 
the explanatory power of our models are strong and we are led to conclude that baseball does seem to contradict the 
human capital model.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The implications of human capital theory are that investments in education will make a worker more 
productive, and thus more valuable to employers. Employees should receive returns on their investments in the form 
of higher wages. Perhaps the most important time in a person’s life is upon high school graduation, when an 
individual must decide between entering the workforce and attending college, assuming one has the academic 
credentials to do so.  
 
 For many high school baseball players drafted by Major League Baseball teams, their decision is whether 
to play baseball on an athletic scholarship at a four year institution or a junior college, or enter the minor leagues. 
Fortunately, many teams have eliminated the mutual exclusiveness nature of this decision by including provisions to 
pay for the college educations of the players once they complete their professional careers. However, the more 
pressing concern for this group of players is which choice will ultimately lead to the highest wages when playing 
professional baseball.  
 
 Using an OLS approach, we found that the estimate for the return to schooling is negative but insignificant. 
Given the limitations in accurately measuring schooling and the inherent motivational and ability biases present in 
those OLS estimates, we used an IV technique to correct for these issues. The results outlined in this paper suggest 
that professional baseball is a purely talent driven labor market and that education seems to play no significant role. 
Given this information, we can speculate that baseball players most likely make decisions as to whether or not to 
enter college based on non-pecuniary factors, such as their career aspirations after their playing days are done.   
 
 However, testing the effect of schooling on annual wages is just one approach to trying to understand the 
effect of education in this particular type of labor market. An alternative methodology would be to investigate the 
statistical correlation between schooling and endorsement income (when this data becomes available), holding on-
the-field performances constant. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Nonetheless, we estimated all our models with a race variable and found the estimates to be insignificant.  
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Table IA. Variable Means and Standard Deviations 
  Full Sample  College  No College 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev  Mean Std. Dev  Mean Std. Dev 
          
Income (2005 Salary)  $2,999,340.00 4,051,843.00  $2,498,941.00 3,463,421.00  $3,590,957.00 4,591,997.00 
Age at start of 2005 season  29.909 4.257  30.524 4.100  29.182 4.336 
Arbitration Eligible  0.284 0.451  0.304 0.461  0.260 0.440 
Attended a Four-Year College   0.458 0.499  0.846 0.362  0.000 0.000 
Attended College  0.542 0.499  1.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Career Homeruns  89.970 107.590  83.106 104.875  98.089 110.433 
Career OBP + Slugging  0.754 0.090  0.753 0.088  0.756 0.093 
Career Stolen Bases  53.009 80.179  48.423 85.729  58.432 72.925 
Free Agent Eligible  0.530 0.500  0.502 0.501  0.563 0.497 
Years of Major League 
Experience   7.539 4.396  7.352 4.355  7.760 4.445 
          
Number of Observations  419   227   192  
 
Table IB. Variable Means and Standard Deviations 
  Full Sample  Four Year College  No Four Year College 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev  Mean Std. Dev  Mean Std. Dev 
          
Income (2005 Salary)  $2,999,340.00 4,051,843.00  $2,480,072.00 3,437,329.00  3438544 4467294 
Age at start of 2005 season  29.909 4.257  30.755 4.154  29.194 4.221 
Arbitration Eligible  0.284 0.451  0.276 0.448  0.291 0.455 
Attended a Four-Year College   0.458 0.499  1.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Attended College  0.542 0.499  1.000 0.000  0.154 0.362 
Career Homeruns  89.970 107.590  87.141 109.042  92.366 106.526 
Career OBP + Slugging  0.754 0.090  0.755 0.086  0.754 0.094 
Career Stolen Bases  53.009 80.179  51.099 91.305  54.626 69.562 
Free Agent Eligible  0.530 0.500  0.521 0.501  0.537 0.500 
Years of Major League 
Experience   7.539 4.396  7.542 4.465  7.537 4.346 
          
Number of Observations  419   192   227  
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Table II: Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Log of Income (2005 Salary)          
  Model 1 (OLS)  Model 2 (OLS)  Model 3 (IV)  Model 4 (IV) 
Variable   Estimate T-statistic  Estimate T-statistic  Estimate T-statistic  Estimate T-statistic 
             
Age at start of 2005 season  -0.046 -2.25  -0.039 -1.93  -0.021 -0.70  -0.021 -0.70 
Arbitration Eligible  0.435 3.09  0.418 2.95  0.407 2.82  0.380 2.53 
Career Homeruns  0.006 9.67  0.006 9.71  0.006 9.63  0.006 9.69 
Career OBP + Slugging  2.051 3.69  2.066 3.72  2.135 3.77  2.108 3.76 
Career Stolen Bases  0.003 6.74  0.003 6.76  0.004 6.72  0.004 6.75 
Free Agent Eligible  1.395 6.23  1.364 6.08  1.320 5.60  1.292 5.31 
Position Dummy (1-9)  -0.017 -1.16  -0.016 -1.12  -0.017 -1.19  -0.015 -1.02 
Years of Major League Experience  0.168 3.10  0.168 3.10  0.160 2.89  0.166 3.05 
Years of Experience Squared  -0.012 -5.19  -0.013 -5.28  -0.013 -5.26  -0.013 -5.27 
Attended College  -0.019 -0.26     -0.021 -1.11    
Attended a Four-Year College       -0.078 -1.08     -0.223 -1.12 
             
Number of Observations  419   419   419   419  
R-Square  0.748   0.749   0.744   .746  
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NOTES 
